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Abstract—This paper presents PUBSUB-SGX, a content-based
publish-subscribe system that exploits trusted execution environ-
ments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, to guarantee confidentiality
and integrity of data as well as anonymity and privacy of
publishers and subscribers. We describe the technical details
of our Python implementation, as well as the required system
support introduced to deploy our system in a container-based
runtime. Our evaluation results show that our approach is
sound, while at the same time highlighting the performance and
scalability trade-offs. In particular, by supporting just-in-time
compilation inside of TEEs, Python programs inside of TEEs
are in general faster than when executed natively using standard
CPython.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, we have been witnessing a contin-
uous growth and adoption of new information technology in
various business areas. Along with this adoption process, old-
fashioned paper workflows as well as obsolete communication
channels are continuously replaced by modern information
systems for data and information exchange.
The publish/subscribe paradigm [1] is a key technology,
as it enables large groups of participants and systems to
exchange information in an efficient manner. In contrast to the
traditional point-to-point communication, the paradigm comes
with the benefit of decoupling data producers (publishers)
from the consumers (subscribers). The decoupling occurs
in two dimensions: time and space. Neither publishers nor
subscribers are aware of each other. Instead, they communicate
only indirectly through the publish/subscribe system. It is the
system’s responsibility to route messages issued by a publisher
to subscribers that previously expressed their interest.
The interest for certain types of messages is typically
expressed using subscriptions. Subscriptions can be arbitrarily
formed based on the filtering and routing capabilities of the
publish/subscribe system. The simplest form of publish/sub-
scribe systems are topic-based [2], [3], [4], where publishers
issue messages on a specific topic, while subscribers register
to the topics they are interesting in.
While the topic-based publish/subscribe model suffices for
most application scenarios, some still require more sophisti-
cated filtering techniques, e.g., taking into account the message
content. Consider for example a truck fleet of a freight
forwarder that continuously publishes its geo-location infor-
mation using the publish/subscribe system [5]. A topic-based
publish/subscribe system would be sufficient if subscribers are
only interested in receiving updates from specific trucks iden-
tified through some unique identifier. However, applications
originating from the logistics domain have often more complex
requirements [6] such as receiving GPS updates only if trucks
are approaching the destination, i.e., entering a bounding box
where the longitude and latitude information stored in the
message body needs to be taken into account for routing.
In its original design, the publish/subscribe paradigm pro-
vides complete time and space decoupling, i.e., the anonymity
of publishers as well as subscribers. While this works well
for many classical applications scenarios, such as a stock
exchange [7] where quotes are made publicly available to
a large group of anonymous subscribers, there exist certain
classes of applications where publishers would like to share
data, yet only with a closed group of subscribers.
In the aforementioned example of the freight forwarder
and its truck fleet, the former intends to publish its geo-
location internally and to its clients. Conversely, a client
should only receive location updates of trucks delivering its
freight rather than being able to observe the whole fleet
movement. Therefore, we propose an extension to the original
publish/subscribe design of content-based routing in the form
of subscription policies, which allows publishers to exclude
certain groups of participants from the reception of certain
messages, while still preserving the remaining properties of
publish/subscribe systems.
Since publish/subscribe systems have to process large vol-
umes of data, a scalable infrastructure is needed in order to
accommodate a large number of publishers and subscribers.
Although the cloud computing paradigm provides an attractive
solution, cloud environments must be considered as untrusted
environments where the cloud provider cannot be trusted.
To harness the power of scalable infrastructures such as
provided by cloud offerings, we propose the use of Intel
software guard extensions (SGX) [8], [9], which enables the
processing of sensitive data in untrusted environments. Note
as well that major Infrastructure-as-a-Service providers (e.g.,
Microsoft Azure [10] and IBM [11]) are introducing SGX-
enabled machines in their commercial offering, suggesting the
relevance of our technological choice.
In this paper, we present PUBSUB-SGX, a content-based
publish/subscribe system that is tailored to applications scenar-
ios that require sharing of information among closed groups
of non-anonymous participants. In order to ensure privacy
and confidentiality when operating in untrusted environments,
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PUBSUB-SGX transparently switches to a shielding mode
running within Intel SGX enclaves, i.e., each process can run
in a separate trusted execution environment (TEE).
The paper makes the following contributions:
(i) We present the micro-service based architecture of
PUBSUB-SGX that ensures high scalability to accommodate
arbitrary workloads;
(ii) we propose an extension to the classical publish/sub-
scribe paradigm to allow the sharing of information among
closed groups of non-anonymous participants;
(iii) we provide just-in-time compilation of Python pro-
grams inside of enclaves to speed up the execution;
(iv) we provide the dynamic loading of libraries inside of
enclaves to enable the execution of general Python programs—
which are often linked with external native libraries; and
(v) present a performance evaluation when using the shield-
ing mode that utilizes Intel SGX.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We
first provide in Section II a detailed description of the use
case. We then detail the architecture of PUBSUB-SGX in
Section III, while implementation details are provided in
Section IV. In Section V, we present the performance of
our system comparing native vs. trusted execution using Intel
SGX. Finally, we survey related work in Section VI and
conclude in Section VII.
II. THE SELIS USE CASE
In this section, we describe the use case that motivated
the work for PUBSUB-SGX. This use case is taken from the
SELIS project [12] whose aim is the creation of a common
information space and platform for European companies op-
erating in the logistics domain.
The aim is driven by the observation that logistic companies
do mostly operate in isolation at the present time and, hence,
share only a little or no information with partners and com-
petitors. This often leads to situations where trucks and vessels
return half empty to their hubs although another partner may
have freight in need of being delivered on the same route.
Besides a low average utilization, making those trips is often
not profitable but also leads to an increased emission of carbon
dioxide.
The lack of information exchange does not only cause
empty trips on roads and at sea but also causes delivery delays
due to unforeseen circumstances often caused by unpredictable
conditions such as weather forecasts. Consider the example of
some freight that is first transported through the Mediterranean
sea before being loaded onto a truck for an onward journey to
its final destination. As weather conditions are unpredictable,
such a vessel may arrive at the port delayed, forcing the truck
scheduled for the freight’s onward journey to wait and in turn
delay the delivery of other freight as well. Due to the lack
of information exchange, such delays cannot be compensated
merely by requesting a partner to take over the onward journey
if capacity permits.
To overcome those challenges, the SELIS project targets
the creation of a common information space as mentioned
previously. The SELIS platform allows logistic companies
to share data that might be of interest for other partners,
collaborators and clients, for example the GPS position of
trucks of a fleet or vessels along with their transported freight
containers. Besides data sharing, the platform also provides
additional information and services such as estimated time
of arrival (ETA) predictions and key performance indicators
(KPIs) tailored to specific participants of the platform. Data
sharing between the different collaborators as well as the
different systems in the platform will be enabled through a
content-based publish/subscribe system acting as information
bus in the SELIS platform.
The choice of using a content-based publish/subscribe sys-
tem rather than a simple topic-based publish/subscribe system
such as Kafka [13] or RabbitMQ [14] originates from the
nature of data shared within the system. Hence, the data does
not only consist of geo-location information for fleets but also
of consignments, border control, customs documents, etc. that
have specific structures and must be filtered and forwarded
based on their content rather than on a simple topic. Consider
for example the GPS position tracking of a truck: for a port
authority, only the arrival, i.e., when the truck enters a specific
bounding box, may be of interest while a client may want to
track the delivery of its freight all the way from the origin up to
its destination. Hence, the GPS updates must be filtered based
on complex rules taking into account only specific attributes
in publications.
The publish/subscribe paradigm is characterized by a loose
coupling, i.e., publishers do not have explicit knowledge about
the existence of subscribers and vice versa [1]. While this
scheme works well for most applications and use-cases, the
SELIS platform requires a more restrictive message dissem-
ination scheme for the following reason. Consider a freight
forwarder publishing the GPS positions of its truck fleet along
with its container contents. While this information is highly
relevant for customs when crossing borders, the container con-
tents itself should not be disclosed to any customer. Moreover,
customers should only be able to subscribe to GPS updates of
trucks transporting their goods and not of updates belonging to
other customers. Hence, in SELIS, the message dissemination
for certain types of publications must be restricted to a specific
group of subscribers or even to a single one. To achieve
this restriction, we propose a permission filtering stage and
subscription policies that can be sent along with publications
providing this additional filtering step. The details for this
mechanism are presented in Section IV.
SELIS is intended to be an open platform accessible for
many actors in the logistics domain. The platform will be run-
ning in cloud environments for scalability and to accommodate
arbitrary workloads. However, running applications in cloud
environments requires additional measures to ensure privacy
and confidentiality. Although several mechanisms exist to
achieve privacy and confidentiality in untrusted environments,
such as [7], we propose the use of Intel SGX as it simplifies the
implementation by using plain text matching while providing
similar guarantees.
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Fig. 1: PUBSUB-SGX Architecture
III. ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the architecture and design of
PUBSUB-SGX. It consists mainly of two components: a load
balancer stage that acts as a proxy and performs a broadcast
for publications as well as subscriptions, and a worker stage
with several instances of broker nodes that carry out the actual
filtering as depicted in Figure 1. Messages transported by the
PUBSUB-SGX use the JavaScript object notation (JSON).
The stage-based design is inspired by the work presented
in [15] as it ensures scalability, i.e, the system can ac-
commodate arbitrary workloads. To achieve scalability, the
load balancer stage distributes the load evenly across the
matcher instances of the second stage. We use subscription
partitioning, i.e., each matcher instance stores only a subset
of the subscriptions.
In the following, we will describe the general message flow
for subscriptions and publications using the presented design.
Subscribers contact the load balancer stage via a TLS-secured
REST endpoint for a secure message exchange (Figure 1-Ê).
The TLS endpoint, i.e., the load balancer stage, forwards the
subscription to the matcher stage, responsible for handling the
matching/filtering. Note that we use subscription partitioning,
i.e., each subscription is hashed modulo the number of matcher
instances and then forwarded only to one of those matcher
instances. Once the subscription arrives at the matcher in-
stance, the subscription is stored in memory for later matching
of publications. The subscription message contains a set of
predicates and attributes used to filter publications.
In addition to storing the subscription at the appropriate
matcher node, the load balancer reports back (using the REST
response to the subscriber) the ID of the matcher instance
that stored the subscription (Figure 1-Ë). This allows the
subscriber to open a secure websocket connection (Figure 1-
Ì) to the load balancer stage indicating from which instance it
shall subsequently receive matched publications in a streaming
fashion. A secure websocket is protected by TLS.
As with subscriptions, publishers connect to the system us-
ing the same TLS endpoint as shown in Figure 1-Í. However,
publications are multicast to all matcher instances since they
may all contain matching subscriptions. The publication is
then forwarded to each subscriber that registered a matching
subscription using the previously established secure websocket
channel (Figure 1-Î).
The matcher stage and load balancer/proxy execute inside
of SGX enclaves to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
the subscriptions and publications. We attest the matchers as
well as the proxy via TLS certificates: the platform ensures
that these components only get access to the private keys of
their certificates if they are executing inside of enclaves.
A. Content Matching Stage
The basic format of the publications in PUBSUB-SGX
consists of key-value pairs represented in JSON notation. For
example, the following JSON code snippet shows a simple
publication of a GPS location update that trucks periodically
publish to the system:
1 { "id": "truck-abc",
2 "lat": 51.0504,
3 "lon": 13.7373}
Similarly to publications, subscriptions also use a list of
key-value pairs. Subscriptions are additionally equipped with
a constraint key-value pair to decide if an attribute, such as lon
or lat shown in the previous example, matches the condition.
For example, the subscription shown below will only match
GPS updates whose latitude values fall within the range of
50-60 degrees:
1 [{ "key": "lat",
2 "val": 50.0,
3 "op" : "gt"},
4 { "key": "lat",
5 "val": 60.0,
6 "op" : "lt"}]
Note that publications only match if all constraints are
satisfied, i.e., they use a logical AND. Hence, in the example
given above, two constraints are used to check if both latitude
constraints are met. In case the subscriber opts to express a
subscription using a logical OR, it can simply register two
individual subscriptions rather than a single one with two
constraints.
The application of PUBSUB-SGX in the logistic domain
showed the necessity for supporting more complex data struc-
tures, where the value contains nested objects or list of
some values. To match market needs, PUBSUB-SGX allows
such publications, however limiting the possibility of defining
subscription constraints only to keys with values of primitive
types. The other keys are ignored during the filtering stage.
For the use-cases where the subscription constraints have to
be evaluated based on nested values, the publication can be
flattened (e.g., using the python flatten_json package).
B. Subscriptions Registration
Subscriptions are stored on a per user/subscriber basis.
Hence, a subscription is registered using an authentication
hash derived from a certificate that the subscriber provides
when connecting to the system. The certificate is used to
prove the subscriber’s identity. Therefore, only subscribers
with a proper certificate can register and remove their own
subscriptions.
Internally, subscriptions are stored in a simple hash map,
which contains the list of subscriptions for each user. In order
to allow the registration of multiple subscriptions per user,
each subscription is also equipped with a unique identifier
(subscription ID).
After the registration of a subscription, the subscriber must
establish a connection to the websocket port of the matcher
stage in order to receive publications that match the previously
defined subscriptions. To establish the secure websocket con-
nection, the authentication hash and the subscription ID are
used to identify the subscriber as well as route only messages
relevant for this particular subscription on the channel.
C. Permission Filtering Stage
Although the previously described matching algorithm en-
ables subscribers to filter data only based on publications that
are of interest for them, a malicious user could still craft a
subscription in such a way that he receives data that a publisher
may not necessarily like to share with everyone.
Consider again the example of a truck fleet that regularly
publishes GPS locations updates. While this data may be
relevant internally for many systems, only a specific group of
users should be able to subscribe and receive GPS locations
of a subset of trucks.
Therefore, we introduce a permission filtering stage that
adds additional constraints in the form of subscription policies
to narrow down the publication of messages to specific groups
of users. For example, if the GPS locations of a truck identified
by its ID truck-bcd should be made available only to a specific
group A, the publisher would install the following constraint
at the permission filtering stage:
1 [{ "key": "id",
2 "val": "truck-bcd",
3 "op" : "eq"},
4 { "key": "group",
5 "val": "A",
6 "op" : "eq"}]
The above filtering rule would apply to any subscriber be-
longing to group A. Hence, if a publication passes the regular
matching stage, i.e., passing all the content-based constraints
that the subscriber expressed, the additional filtering ensures
that only GPS location updates of the truck with ID truck-bcd
will be forwarded to the subscribers of group A. Note that the
group field can also be defined in form of a wildcard “*”,
which would apply to any subscriber including anonymous
ones.
A common scenario for an application of subscription
policies is the enforcement of authorization rules in the system,
where individual modules, users, companies or departments
are allowed to access only limited information due to the
privacy constraints. The permissions of subscribers can be
stored in the identity and access management system (IAM),
which can be queried later by PUBSUB-SGX. For role-based
access control, the configuration file with the permissions can
be loaded during startup of PUBSUB-SGX.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We designed our system with the goal of building a modular
and easy maintainable system that uses as much as possible
existing and well maintained technologies. Our architecture is
based on a micro-service approach where the matcher as well
as the proxy instances are carried out as REST-based services.
Each of those instances acts as a server and often also as a
REST client in order to exchange data between the individual
matcher and the proxy nodes.
The micro-service based approach allows us to choose from
different technologies as well as to swap out individual com-
ponents more easily in order to implement/test new features
and to investigate performance trade-offs. In our current im-
plementation, we use GoReplay [16], a Go-based proxy/replay
server in order to multi-cast publications across a set of
matcher instances, while the matcher instances themselves are
implemented in Python using the Flask framework offering a
convenient abstraction for REST-based server implementations
with TLS support out of the box. We want to point out that
the TLS connections are terminated inside the SGX enclaves.
In order to provide privacy preserving content-based routing
in such a system, we require to protect the confidentiality of
all data and the integrity of both the code as well as the data.
We use SCONE [17], a framework that supports both Go as
well as Python - allowing us to run the different technologies
inside Intel SGX enclaves.
We extended SCONE, however, to support PyPy (just in
time Python) as well as dynamic loading of shared libraries
during runtime. Dynamic loading of shared libraries is required
since many Python modules call functions implemented in
shared libraries not loaded at startup.
A. Loading of Libraries at Runtime
SCONE supports, out of the box, the loading of dynamic
libraries at startup. We have added the support to load dynamic
libraries after a program has already been started.
When a program starts, SCONE loads the binary inside of a
newly created enclave. Actually, SCONE provides a modified
link loader such that SCONE can actually load unmodified
binaries inside of enclaves. When a binary is dynamically
linked, it also loads all libraries into the enclave the program
was linked with. SCONE makes sure that all pages containing
the library code are executable.
An enclave has an unique hash that is computed by the CPU
when the enclave is set up. This hash is called MrEnclave.
Every page that is added to an enclave and its permissions,
i.e., if the page is readable, writable, and executable, influence
MrEnclave. SCONE also measures, with the help of the CPU,
the content of all pages added to an enclave. MrEnclave
therefore reflects both the content of all pages as well as their
meta-data (as permissions).
Dynamic libraries loaded during startup are measured, i.e.,
MrEnclave will be modified when a library would be modified
by an attacker or a failure or any other way. In other words,
we can protect the integrity of the code by ensuring that
MrEnclave has a value that the developer expected. SCONE
verifies MrEnclave during startup via remote attestation and
ensures that only if MrEnclave has the expected value, the
program can get access to its secrets.
The Python interpreter is typically dynamically linked and
hence, shared libraries are loaded during startup into the
enclave. Python often loads additional shared libraries when
a Python program imports a module. Many Python modules
contain also some C implementation to either speed up the
execution or since the Python code is only an API to an
existing code module. For example, PUBSUB-SGX imports
the Python threading library which in turn imports a collection
library which in turns loads a dynamic library _collections.
Hence, we need to support the loading of libraries after a
startup.
To add such a support, we needed to address two problems:
1) inside of enclaves, we cannot change the page permissions,
i.e., we cannot make pages into which we load a dynamic
library executable, 2) the integrity of these libraries are not
protected by MrEnclave since MrEnclave is not modified after
the initial startup.
We address the first problem as follows. During startup,
we make sure that a part of the heap is executable. We can
load dynamic libraries into this part and actually be able
to execute the functions defined in the library. However, an
executable heap introduces a potential security issue since an
attacker could inject code there. We can, however, ask the
operating system during startup to make pages of the heap
non-executable. The operating system can enforce this with the
help of the page table. When we load a new shared library, we
make this page executable. To exploit executable heap pages,
an attacker would need to change the page protection with the
help of the operating system first. Note that the next version
of SGX will be able to change the permissions of pages after
startup. Hence, this problem will soon be addressed by new
hardware.
To address the second problem, we use the file system
shield built into SCONE. The file system shield supports
the encryption and integrity protection of files. Basically, this
shield implements a Merkle tree to verify the integrity of files.
We ensure that the integrity of files is checked during the
loading into the enclave. Only if dynamic libraries have not
been modified, they will be permitted to be loaded into an
enclave.
B. Supporting PyPy inside SGX enclaves
SCONE supports several implementation languages, includ-
ing Python. The standard implementation of SCONE’s Python
support uses CPython [18]. For the development of this work,
we added support for PyPy [19]. PyPy is a faster alternative to
CPython: while CPython simply interprets code, PyPy, which
is built over the RPython framework, uses Just-In-Time (JIT)
compilation.
As we show in the evaluation section, the support of PyPy
resulted in a significant improvement of performance for most
Python programs. PyPy is broadly applicable: while there
are a few micro-benchmarks for which PyPy is slower than
CPython, in many longer running benchmarks, PyPy clearly
outperforms CPypthon.
To be able to support PyPy, we need to make sure that
pages are executable in which PyPy stores the generated code.
As we explained above, in the current version of SGX, we
cannot change the page permissions inside of an enclave. We
addressed this problem in the same way as above: we support
the modification of page permissions by making all heap pages
executable and only change the page permissions with the help
of the OS.
C. Fault Tolerance and Elasticity
In the current version of our system, we omitted the imple-
mentation of primitives such as checkpointing and logging [20]
needed for fault tolerance, as well as state migration techniques
to allow the system a seamless scaling and adaption to
fluctuating workloads. However, we designed the architecture
of our system such that those primitives can be easily added.
First, we use subscription partitioning where the number of
partitions can be arbitrarily defined. Subscription partitioning
allows the system to scale with an increasing number of pub-
lications and subscriptions, as well as providing low overhead
fault tolerance as each individual partition can be checkpointed
independently.
Second, since partitions are uniquely identifiable using parti-
tion IDs and due to the fact that subscriptions and publications
are multi-casted to all instances, we can also provide fault
tolerance using active replication [21] by simply deploying
the same partition multiple times onto the system. Although
this replication scheme does not require fault tolerance prim-
itives in place such as checkpointing and logging in order to
provide high availability, it comes with the disadvantage of
delivering matched publications multiple times depending on
the replication factor chosen for a particular matcher instance.
In order to allow the system to scale elastically during
runtime, the previously mentioned active replication scheme
can be utilized as in [22]. However, in order to allow the dy-
namic addition and removal of nodes at runtime, the GoReplay
implementation must be slightly extended to allow the addition
and removal of nodes to which the captured traffic will be
forwarded to. Furthermore, the system must be extended with
a controller unit that receives performance probes and decides
which partition should be replicated and moved to another
spare node if the node the partition is currently running on is
close to its saturation point.
Although the previously mentioned primitives allow the
system to recover from faults and improve the overall systems
availability, the system is still prone to message loss and the
reception of duplicated messages in the event of a crash of
an instance. This can be circumvented by enforcing message
ordering as it ensures that publications and subscriptions
are processed in identical order at every instance. However,
implementing message ordering adds a non-negligible run-
time overhead (as authors have shown in [23]) which can be
omitted if exactly onces processing semantics are not needed.
V. EVALUATION
This section reports the results of our evaluation that assess
the performance of our system with regards to scalability,
as well as overhead when running in shielded mode using
Intel SGX hardware. First, we present our evaluation settings
followed by a description of our dataset and data generator
used for our benchmarks.
A. Evaluation Settings
For the experiments, we used a local cluster comprising of 8
nodes, each one equipped with a Intel Xeon E3-1270 v5 CPU
with 4 cores running at 3.6 GHz, 8 hyper-threads (2 per core)
and 8 MB cache. Each server has 64 GB of main memory and
runs Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS with Linux kernel version 4.4. In
order to avoid interference of the workload generator and the
publish/subscribe instances, we use a separate node equipped
with two 14-core Intel Xeon E5-2683 v3 CPUs running at 2
GHz with 112 GB of RAM. All nodes have a 10 Gb Ethernet
NIC connected to a dedicated switch.
B. Workload Description
In order to mimic the workload used in SELIS, we imple-
mented a workload generator that creates subscriptions based
on the subscription profile typically used in SELIS. In addition
to the subscription generator, we also implemented a workload
generator for publications as we do not have access to real
traces from our project partners. Publications are generated and
submitted through wrk2 [24], a benchmarking tool for http
servers which allows to set predefined data rates to exercise the
server. We leverage wrk2’s LUA scripting interface to extend
the generator. Specifically, we create different publications
based on the chosen subscription profile. Furthermore, we
measure the throughput as well as the number of forwarded
publications on subscriber side in addition to the publisher
interface. This allows us to verify correctness and measure
potential queuing effects.
C. Experiments
In this section, we will provide an overview of performance
measurements of our system.
1) Scalability: In our first experiment, we assess the scal-
ability of the system. As mentioned previously, we chose
Python for the implementation of the matcher instances as
it simplifies and reduces the code base as well as takes away
the developer’s burden of taking care of error prone aspects
such as memory management, etc. Although the use of Python
provides many benefits, the global interpreter lock (GIL) limits
performance as a python instance is effectively only running
in single threaded mode. As our system is designed to run in
a distributed setting, multiple matcher instances can run either
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Fig. 2: Publication/matching rate with varying number of
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Fig. 3: Latency with varying number of matcher instances.
on the same node or on different node providing horizontal as
well as vertical scale out.
Figure 2 depicts the scalability of the system. For this
experiment, we varied the number of matcher instances (from
1-8) but left the number of total subscriptions (256) stored
at the system constant. Note that each subscription comprises
40 attributes that are being matched leading to this relatively
low absolute throughput. Since our system uses subscription
partitioning, a higher number of matcher instances leads to
less subscription stored in each matcher node, allowing the
system to perform the subscription matching in parallel. As
shown in Figure 2, the initial throughput of 20 publications/s
increases as we add more server instances until we reach a
peak of approximately 90 publications/s using 8 instances.
The corresponding latency for the same experiment is shown
in Figure 3. As expected, latency decreases when using more
instances as publications are processed in parallel delivering
matched publications earlier.
2) Overhead Shielding: In the next experiment, we as-
sess the overhead of using the shielding capabilities to run
our system in untrusted environments using Intel SGX. For
this experiment, we used two different versions of Python
(CPython and PyPy) and measured throughput and latency
of our PUBSUB-SGX system when running in native vs.
protected/shielded mode. We furthermore varied the number
of subscription stored at the matcher instance. Note that in our
experiment, each subscriber stores only a single subscription,
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without Intel SGX.
hence, the amount of subscribers is identical to the number of
subscriptions stored at the system.
The results of this benchmark are shown in Figure 4. As
shown in the graph, throughput decreases with an increasing
number of subscriptions stored at the matcher stage. This is ex-
pected as with each incoming publication, more subscriptions
must be traversed and checked for a match. Furthermore, the
PyPy implementation outperforms CPython for native as well
as shielded execution. In average, we can observe an overhead
for running the system using Intel SGX of approximately
30% in average. However, when comparing the execution of
CPython native versus PyPy using Intel SGX, we can even
observe that the shielded version outperforms the CPython
native by about 40% in average. Interestingly, the performance
gain decreases as soon as more subscriptions are stored in the
system which recommends the use of more instances.
Again, Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the latency for the
same experiment. As shown in the graph, latency increases
with an increasing number of subscriptions as with each
incoming publication, all subscriptions must be traversed and
checked for matches, increasing naturally latency. Although
the SCONE PyPy variant outperforms the CPython native ex-
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Fig. 6: CPU utilization with varying number of subscribers
with and without Intel SGX.
ecution, the user pays a price for latency. In our measurements,
we saw a 75% latency increase for CPython (SCONE) in
comparison to the native execution, and 1.2 times the latency
when using the PyPy SCONE version. However, the system
still delivers publications in sub-second range, still providing
the user with acceptable service.
In addition to latency and throughput, we also measured the
CPU utilization of the system. The result for this measurement
is depicted in Figure 6. As shown in the graph, the CPU
utilization stays constant at 12.5% when executing the system
in native mode. This is due to the single threaded execution
of our Python-based matcher instance. Note that the system is
equipped with 8 cores, i.e., the full utilization of all course
leads to 100%. However, we can see a marginal increase
in CPU utilization when more subscriptions are stored and
the shielding mode is used. In general, the shielded version
consumes more CPU resources as SCONE uses a worker
thread checking for system call returns using a spin lock.
However, as seen in the graph, the CPU utilization does not
fully saturate all available CPU resources available on all
nodes. This is due to the Python’s global interpreter lock
(GIL) leaving the system running in single threaded mode as
mentioned previously.
3) Vertical Scalability using Workers: In order to achieve
better vertical scalability in addition to the deployment of
multiple instances, we extended our system such that multiple
worker threads perform publication matching in parallel at an
instance. This is achieved by having a worker queue where
incoming requests are enqueued and consumed by multiple
workers. Using multiple workers (as processes in Python)
allows the matcher instances to make progress despite slow
subscribers that consume matched publications too slowly
causing unnecessary back pressure.
In order to assess the performance for this implementation
improvement, we varied the number of worker threads (Python
threads) as shown in Figure 7. As depicted in the graphs,
multiple workers lead only to a performance gain in the
PyPy shielded variant when using up to 2 workers. Using
more workers, performance decreases as there is too much
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contention on the single worker queue. Also latency is reduced
as shown in Figure 8 as less publishers are blocked due
to slow consumers. Although this approach outperforms the
single worker variant (when using PyPy), the implementation
lacks of appropriate back-pressure control causing an increase
of enqueued messages if the system is close to its saturation
point.
4) Permission Filtering: Contrary to the original design
of content-based routing systems, we extended PUBSUB-
SGX with an additional permission filtering stage. This stage
allows publishers to narrow down the dissemination of certain
messages to a closed group of non-anonymous participants
desired.
Since the permission filtering is applied to every publication
that matches content wise, the performance overhead needs to
be taken in account as well. We therefore extended the system
such that we can dynamically enable and disable permission
filtering. The results for the overhead introduced through the
permission filtering stage is depicted in 9.
In this experiment, we varied the introduced publication
rate from 500 publications/s up to the point where the system
saturates. As shown in the figure, the permission filtering adds
only as little as 28% overhead when the system reached its
saturation point. If the system is not saturated, there is almost
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no noticeable overhead when using the permission filtering
stage. However, in the current setting, we only used a small
number of permissions (4). As more publishers like to restrict
message dissemination, we expect higher overheads similar as
when increasing the number of subscriptions.
5) PyPy & Shielding Overhead: In our last experiment, we
were interested about the overhead for PyPy and our Intel SGX
based shielding for other classes of applications implemented
in Python. The need for the evaluation arises from the SELIS
use case where not only information is disseminated through
the PUBSUB-SGX system but also KPI and ETA predictions
provided in a streaming fashion on top of our system.
We therefore executed the SpeedTest [25] benchmark of-
ficially available to assess the performance of PyPy in com-
parison to CPython as well as its performance when running
using Intel SGX. The results are depicted in Figure 10.
As shown in the graph, the execution time when using PyPy
in shielded mode is often on par or even less in comparison
with a native execution using CPython. This clearly advocates
for the use of PyPy in conjunction with the shielded execution.
VI. RELATED WORK
There are two main categories of systems that relate with
PUBSUB-SGX. In the first category (Section VI-A) we report
on systems that tackle confidentiality issues in publish/sub-
scribe systems. In the second one (Section VI-B), we briefly
overview how TEEs in general (and Intel SGX in particular)
are being adopted and used for several different purposes.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one existing
system (SCBR [26]) that efficiently combines the publish/sub-
scribe paradigm with Intel SGX. SCBR integrates with Intel
SGX by running the code of the brokers inside the enclaves,
thus preventing an attacker with full control to inspect the mes-
sages in transit through the network. Conversely, PUBSUB-
SGX prevents unintended messages to being routed to such
brokers by means of properly crafted subscription policies,
leveraging the mechanisms described earlier.
A. Confidentiality in Publish/Subscribe Systems
There is a large body of work on confidentiality issues
in publish/subscribe systems [27]. PP-CBPS is one of the
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Fig. 10: Normalized execution time (against native PyPy) of PyPyScone and native CPython.
first attempts to provide support for it [28]. It was built on
top of the popular SIENA [29]. It relies on heavyweight
cryptographic techniques, and in some cases (e.g., equality
filtering), it performs the matching within 10× that of the
baseline. As shown in the evaluation, PUBSUB-SGX improves
greatly on these results by exploiting the hardware support for
cryptographic operations offered directly by the TEEs.
PS3 [30] exploits Cipher-text Policy Attribute Based En-
cryption (CP-ABE) and Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [31]
to protect the privacy of subscriber interest and confidentiality
of published content. This system assumes an honest-but-
curious threat model as well colluding subscribers. PUBSUB-
SGX supports a more powerful threat model, as provided
directly by the security guarantees offered by SGX.
Thrifty [7] uses a pre-filtering stage and containment graphs
(inspired by Bloom filters [32]) to implement encrypted match-
ing operators. This system relies on ASPE [33], a crypto-
graphic technique used to implement efficient subscription
matching. PUBSUB-SGX does not require the implementation
of complex cryptographic primitives, given that confidential
data is only managed within the hardware boundaries of the
enclaves.
B. Systems Leveraging TEEs
Trusted execution environments have gained a lot of traction
in the last years. Several systems and applications have been
developed to leverage their additional security guarantees.
TEEs are lately being used to accelerate blockchain-
like transaction throughputs [34], improving the security
of systems offering anonymity while browsing [35], web
searches [36] and more.
SecureKeeper [37] implements a privacy-preserving coordi-
nation service, preserving the confidentiality of the managed
data by exploiting the SGX hardware enclaves. Similar to
PUBSUB-SGX, this system does not require the clients to
know the keys used by the enclaves to encrypt data toward
the data store.
SecureStream [38] exploits Intel SGX to deploy and run
data processing pipelines over untrusted clouds. It uses Lua
VM [39] and ZeroMQ [40] channels to establish secure
communications between the stages of the pipeline. PUBSUB-
SGX uses Python and secure web-sockets on top of TLS
between the matchers, the subscribers and publishers.
Finally, Sampaio et al. built on top of SCBR and con-
sider that publications maybe be restricted to a set of sub-
scribers [41]. Nevertheless, the approach involves a third-
party entity that filters individual subscriptions according to
limitations from the publishers. Filtering the subscriptions on
the publisher side may not be applicable to all cases and may
limit scalability.
VII. CONCLUSION
The publish/subscribe model presents a compelling
paradigm for highly scalable communication systems. This
paper introduces the design and evaluation of PUBSUB-SGX,
a privacy-preserving content-based publish/subscribe system
that exploits Intel SGX enclaves. We implemented a full
prototype in Go and Python, also by extending the SCONE
container runtime with full support to PyPy. The experimental
evaluation uses a trace generator inspired by a real-world
use-case in the domain of logistics. The results shows that
our system scales well with the number of subscribers and
publishers. Furthermore, our system outperforms CPython’s
native execution when using shielding in conjunction with
PyPy. Similarly, its CPU overhead is modest if compared
against an insecure version. In future, we plan to add support
for fault tolerance and elasticity such that the system can
dynamically adapt to fluctuating workloads.
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